Modern financial systems are characterized by a complex set of interdependencies among a large number of institutions. Stress to one part of the system can spread to others, often threatening the stability of the entire financial system. The critical need for a fundamental understanding of the structure and dynamics of this system has been emphasized by the recent financial crisis precipitated by counterparty exposures revealed by the Lehman bankruptcy and the near-bankruptcy of AIG, as well as the European debt crisis caused by the exposure of European banks to sovereign default risk. In the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, regulators have come to recognize that interconnectedness can pose substantial threats to the stability of the financial system.
Financial instability typically results from positive feedback loops intrinsic to the operation of the financial system; the instability results from responses to shocks that reinforce and amplify the initial shock. The structures and mechanisms that create the positive feedback must, therefore, be a focus of analysis of financial stability, and new tools are needed to identify and model these structures and mechanisms.
In addition, under extreme circumstances the steps taken by individual agents to mitigate the risk of financial systems can become the very source of destabilizing positive feedback through their interaction with other agents. We refer to these steps as locally stabilizing but globally destabilizing. This phenomenon is illustrated by bank runs. Suppose a bank is weakened by losses. The prudent action for each individual depositor is to withdraw funds, yet this very response will drive the bank to failure if followed by every depositor (Diamond and Dybvig [1983] ). The longer the line of customers outside grows, the greater the incentive for more customers to join the line, and the stronger the amplifying feedback.
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The problem of traditional bank runs was largely solved through deposit insurance, which effectively eliminates any reason for depositors to react to news about a bank. However, similar dynamics operate throughout the financial system. For example, a bank/dealer facing a shortfall in funding might reduce the lending it provides to hedge funds, and to control their risk, the hedge funds might respond by liquidating positions. But this circuit of actions, reasonable and prudent for each of the two sectors, can lead to global instability: The resulting decline in prices reduces the value of collateral, reducing the cash provided to the bank/dealer on the one hand, and leading to further margin calls and demand for forced liquidation by the hedge funds on the other.
Examples of these patterns have been identified as fire sale dynamics.
1 But to understand these critical aspects of the financial system comprehensively, we need a systematic way to identify the paths of feedback globally wherever they may arise. To do so, one must understand the conduits for the transmission of information and the control mechanisms applied by the various financial entities based on their observations of flows and the financial environment. A further complicating fact is that the nature of this feedback is scale dependent. For example, a small change in prices, funding, or a bank's financial condition might be absorbed by the system, but a large shock might trigger a destabilizing cascade.
We introduce signed directed graphs (SDGs) as a tool for understanding the feedback effects in financial systems. SDGs are extensively used in process systems engineering. An SDG representation captures the information transmission, environmental state, and causal rela-tionships that underlie feedback. It encodes the control rules and responses, followed by individual units within a financial system, and provides a framework for systematically investigating the resulting interactions between these units. In particular, the SDG representation can be used to identify cycles of positive feedback that may not be immediately apparent, and to pinpoint areas of potential stress and instability in a systematic manner.
The SDG framework is able to represent and reveal information missed by more traditional network models of financial interconnections. Network models typically describe payment obligations and flows, and they can be effective in quantifying the degree and complexity of the connections among the financial entities. Standard network models represent financial entities as nodes and the flows between them as edges. Research questions in this area focus on which types of networks provide robust structures for the financial system (Allen and Babus [2009] ; Battiston et al. [2013] ; Gai and Kapadia [2010] ). But these models lack a representation for the flow of information and responses to information; they do not provide a vehicle for understanding how responses and controls of multiple agents interact or the inner workings of an institution summarized by a single node.
In engineering systems, safety and stability are design criteria. In contrast, the financial system is self-organized. Individual financial entities generally have risk management procedures and controls to preserve their own stability, but the system as a whole was never engineered for safety and stability. Because of this, it is all the more critical to understand the paths of positive and negative feedback, alternative routes for funding and securities flows in the event of a shock to one node or edge of the network, and more generally, how the interactions of the system can create vulnerabilities and instability. for network analysis to gain a better understanding of the dynamic process underlying the financial system. Although researchers have suggested the Internet, electrical power grid, and transportation network as potential models for the financial system, none of these have the richness of phenomena seen in a large-scale chemical process plant. Various physical/chemical transformations, feedback and recycle loops, etc., can serve as relevant and useful analogies for modeling the financial system. In the existing network-based models risk travels along edges.
However, these models ignore the financial transformations executed within the nodes that generate and compound risk. Although flows and connections are important, the picture of risk creation and contagion is incomplete without understanding the control of the production process.
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SDG Modeling Framework for Financial Networks
Exhibit 3: Simplified Bank/Dealer Network Source: Aguiar, Bookstaber, and Wipf [2014] We now explain how SDG models can be used to analyze the dynamics of financial systems. The financial system can be represented in a manner that is analogous to a processing plant by mapping the flows of funding, assets, and collateral through the various financial agents and delineating the transformations the agents perform on those flows (Aguiar, Bookstaber, and Wipf [2014] ). A bank/dealer acts as an intermediary between buyers and sellers of
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Office of Financial Researchsecurities and between lenders and borrowers of funding. Its clients are investors, such as asset management firms, hedge funds, and pension funds, as well as other bank/dealers. There are specific business units within the bank/dealer that process funding and securities to create products for these clients. The bank/dealer's network, with its connections to other financial entities and between its business units, is complex. To demonstrate the process systems engineering inspired modeling framework, we now consider a simplified version of the reality and focus only on two types of bank/dealer activities shown in Exhibit 3:
1. Funding and securities lending: The Bank/Dealer goes to sources of funding such as money market funds through the repo market, and to security lenders such as pension funds and asset management firms through their custodian banks.
Providing liquidity as a market maker:
The Bank/Dealer goes to the asset markets, to institutions that hold assets, and to other market makers to acquire positions in the securities that clients demand. This function also includes securitization taking securities and restructuring them. This involves liquidity and risk transformations.
The functions we show within the Bank/Dealer include the Prime Broker, which lends cash to hedge funds in order for the hedge funds to buy securities on margin; the Financing Desk, which borrows cash with high-quality securities used as collateral; and the Trading Desk, which manages inventory in its market making activities that it finances through the Financing Desk. The Bank/Dealer interacts with Cash Providers, such as money market funds, pension funds, and insurance companies; other bank/dealers through the over-the-counter market, which is the market for the Bank/Dealer to acquire or lay off inventory; and hedge funds, which seek leverage and securities from Prime Brokers to support their long and short trading posi-tions. Hedge funds also represent the wider swath of institutional customers that use the Bank/Dealer's market making function, ranging from asset managers and hedge funds to pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and insurance companies.
The interactions between the Bank/Dealer's functional areas create various transformations, like parts of a processing plant. The Financing Desk takes short-term loans from the Cash Providers and passes them through to clients with lower credit standing, often as longerterm loans. In doing this, the Bank/Dealer is engaging in both a maturity and a credit transformation. The Trading Desk inventories securities until it can either lay it off based on the demand of another client or to the over-the-counter market. In doing this, it provides a liquidity transformation.
The network for the Bank/Dealer is more interconnected than that of a chemical plant, because some clients, which are the nodes that receive the output from a bank/dealer, are also sources of inputs. A Hedge Fund borrowing in order to buy securities might also be lending other securities. A pension fund providing funding might also be using the Bank/Dealer for market making. Hedge funds and related institutional investors are on both sides of the production because they are both buyers and sellers of securities, and in that sense they provide inputs as well as output in market making.
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Office of Financial Research For simplicity, we consider a system with a single market asset (such as a stock or a bond). Its price is represented by the node P BDM , and this price level influences, and is influ- The Trading Desk provides a market making function; it stands ready to take on any quantity sent its way by the hedge fund. This increases its inventory of shares, and when this inventory becomes too large relative to a set point, it opens the overflow control to pass shares through to the market, dropping the price as a result. The Trading Desk's market making function distinguishes its control mechanism from that of the Hedge Fund. As with the hedge fund, the Trading Desk depends on the Financing Desk to fund its inventory, and a drop in funding might force the Trading Desk to release more shares into the Bank/Dealer Market.
The Money Market provides funding for both the Hedge Fund and the Trading Desk through the Finance Desk; and it is changes in the funding of the Funding Desk that lead to changes in the quantity held by the Hedge Fund and the Trading Unit, ultimately changing the price.
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The entire system is driven by, and feeds back into, the prices set in the bank/dealer market. These prices are determined by the actions of the Trading Desk and the Hedge Fund, and determine the collateral value that helps drive the willingness of the various agents along the path to provide funding.
The SDG model clearly illustrates why the financial system becomes embroiled in one crisis after another: Nearly all of the pathways extending from the Money Market through the bank/dealers to the hedge funds are positive, so a shock to one node may create a positive feedback, exacerbating the shock. This can be seen by applying the SDG framework and its associated process hazard analysis methodology to the two most common sources of financial crisis -funding runs and fire sales.
Process hazards analysis (Venkatasubramanian et al. [2000]; Venkatasubramanian
[2011]; Zhao et al. [2005a Zhao et al. [ , 2005b ) is a methodology for systematically identifying abnormal causes and adverse consequences that can occur anywhere in the process system. In the context of an SDG model, process hazards analysis provides the framework that can guide us in identifying methodically what can go wrong at each node and edge and how that failure would propagate through the rest of the system. Given the self-organized nature of financial networks, here we focus on identifying and examining feedback loops in an SDG model. The complete list can be computed via a depth-first search of the SDG (Russell and Norvigm [2003] ). Not all positive loops are necessarily significant sources of vulnerability because the edges of the SDG record the direction of influence but not its magnitude. An individual node is typically subject to multiple competing effects, so the net effect ultimately depends on the gain associated
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Fire Sales Exhibit 6 shows a segment of the SDG model of Exhibit 4 that focuses on the interaction of the Hedge Fund with the Bank/Dealer's Prime Broker. The fire sale occurs when there is a disruption to the system that forces a hedge fund to sell positions. As Exhibit 6 shows, this disruption can occur through three channels: a price drop and resulting drop in asset value, an increase in the margin rate that leads to a margin call from the Prime Broker, or a drop in the loan capacity of the Prime Broker. As the Hedge Fund reduces its assets, prices drop again, leading to a second (and subsequent) round of feedback, which makes the situation worse in each iteration. Market's margin rate, which might occur due to an erosion of confidence. The drop in funding negatively affects the amount of inventory the Trading Desk can carry, and as a result, it sells into the market. As is the case with dynamics associated with fire sales, selling drops prices, which feeds back to the value of collateral, and can precipitate a further reduction in funding from the Money Market.
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The unintended consequences are even more widespread than this. There are links between the segments representing fire sales and funding runs, so a funding run might precipitate a fire sale, and vice versa. From the SDG model, it is clear that a fire sale can lead to funding run, if the fire sale by the Hedge Fund drops prices to the point that the Cash Provider, seeing erosion in their collateral, begin to reduce funding. SDG model also shows that there is pathway in the opposite direction: drop in funding to the Trading Desk to lead to a reduction in inventory, causing a drop in prices which reduces the value of the Hedge Fund portfolio, leading the Prime Broker to increase its margin level, inducing a forced sale. The forced sale will add yet another positive feedback loop to the initial price impact that came from the Trading Desk. So actions that are reasonable locally can contribute to adverse global consequences. A further advantage is that the framework allows us to formulate more sophisticated models as necessary in a methodical manner. For instance, we now show how we can add numerical gains (Vaidhyanathan and Venkatasubramanian [1996] ) on all the edges connecting various nodes and perform a quantitative analysis of how shocks of different magnitudes might propagate through the system. The gains used in this example are for illustrative purposes only and are not meant to reflect actual market conditions. In practice, these gains can be estimated using a combination of historic market data and the judgment of experienced market professionals.
Semiquantitative Analysis Consider a loop of the form ( 1 , 2 , … , , +1 = 1 ) where each pair of nodes ( , +1 ) is connected by a directed edge. Suppose the value of node +1 as a function of the value of node is given by the functional relationship +1 = f i ( ). The semiquantitative analysis proceeds in two steps:
1. Initiate a disturbance at node 1 2. Propagate the deviation through the nodes 2 , 3 , … , back to +1 = 1 .
We are interested in quantifying whether the loop amplifies or diminishes the initial disturbance. Let = Δ / denote the relative change in the value of node . Then
Thus, the relative change in the value is a function of both the relative change −1 and the current value −1 . Note that when f -1 ( −1 ) is linear, i.e., f -1 ( −1 ) = −1 , the function F -1 ( −1 ) = −1 . In the sequel, we will suppress the dependence on the current value −1 .
We will denote +1 , i.e., the relative disturbance in the value of node 1 after one iteration We now illustrate this approach on Loop 7 displayed in Exhibit 11. Suppose the starting node 1 = . Our goal is to determine the relative change in the value of 1 = after one iteration. We assume that the market conditions are described as follows: These values are chosen simply to illustrate the methodology; we do not claim that the values chosen are representative of true market conditions. We will first compute the functions F ( ) for each of the nodes, and then compute the feedback effect.
1. = F 1 ( ). The leverage
, it follows that
The relationship between and is as follows. The price change results in a change in the leverage ; this change triggers a trade since the hedge fund is targeting a fixed leverage . Thus, the hedge either takes on more loan or pays down some of the loan in order to reset the leverage back to . Thus, the relative change can be computed from the relation
Using the relationship that = F 1 ( ) it follows that
= F 4 ( ), and = F 6 ( ). The functions f 3 , f 4 , and f 6 are all linear; therefore, it follows that F 3 ( ) = , F 4 ( ) = , and
4. = F 5 ( ). When the trading desk purchases (or sells) shares the capital of the trading desk decreases (or increases), and; the relationship is linear. Therefore, = − . The relative change in leverage is given by
Therefore, it follows that
The relationship between and is as follows. So long as ≤ 0, i.e., the trading desk leverage is less than or equal to the leverage set point , no action is taken. However, when the > 0, the trading desk sells assets to reset the error = 0. This trading impacts the price . Thus, there is a complex nonlinear relationship between and that needs to be calibrated from data.
For the purpose of illustrating SDG approach, we assume
Now we are in a position to compute the loop gain , / using (2) and the nominal market condition described above. , can be determined for a given , .
Exhibit 12 reports the loop gains for all the 14 loops for both normal and crisis conditions, and for small (1 percent) and large (5 percent) initial decrease. Specifically, for Loop 7 under normal market conditions, a 1 percent initial decrease in results in a 0.53 percent final decrease in , i.e., the feedback through the system stabilizes the price. However, under crisis conditions, the same sale could trigger a 10.53 percent decrease in price. Thus, iterating over the loop several times leads to a fire sale situation.
Since the SDG approach allows one to model how the system might behave to price shocks under normal and abnormal conditions, this approach can serve as a framework for methodical stress testing and monitoring the critical nodes and edges. The next level of sophistication would be to develop differential (or difference) equations based dynamic models, which provide a more detailed analysis of the dynamic behavior of the financial system.
Conclusion
The financial system is self-organized; it did not develop as a carefully engineered system with proper consideration given to the stability and the management of its complex interactions. Because of this, it is all the more critical to understand the paths of positive and negative feedback, alternative routes for funding and securities flows in the event of a shock to one node or edge of the network, and more generally, how the dynamic interactions in the system can create vulnerabilities and instabilities.
We suggest that a process systems engineering framework is a useful modeling paradigm for this challenge. In particular, causal models represented as SDGs and the associated process hazards analysis framework can add the critical capabilities missing in the current network-based approaches emerging as the leading modeling framework for the financial system.
The SDG framework adds crucial information to the context of linkages in a network in terms of the direction of various flows and whether they contribute positive or negative feedback, thereby providing a systematic framework for analyzing the potential hazards and instabilities in the system. We show this framework can reveal instabilities and mechanisms of failure that may not be apparent in a network-based perspective for large financial systems. This framework can highlight and help us monitor dynamics such as fire sales and funding runs, where actions that are locally stabilizing, such as a financial institution taking risk management actions without an understanding of the systemic implications, might cascade to have globally destabilizing consequences.
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